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Abstract 
The traditional education system in Qing China has been widely debated over the past decades. 
Some have argued it was efficient and furthered economic growth, while others have stressed its 
inefficient nature, which led to the introduction of the modern education system in the closing 
decades of the 19
th
 century, followed by its total collapse in 1905.  
 In this paper we make a first try to quantify above debate. Starting from the observation that 
below the well-known civil examination system there existed a whole system of popular and 
vocational education, we find that years of education in the population were still lower than in many 
European countries.  More interestingly, whereas in European countries years of education increased 
strongly in the 19
th
 century, our estimates of average years of education and the ABCC indices show 
that the level of education remained stable well into the 1920s when it accelerated. However, the 
main rise only occurred during the late 20
th
 century.  
 This finding leads to an interesting question since per capita income only started to grow 
significantly since the 1950s. This means that the rise of education since the mid-1920s was not as 
such driven by per capita income. Apparently this was the same for both the traditional and modern 
education since the latter had already started to transform Chinese education from the 1890s 
onwards.  Hence, we have to look at the question why persons decided to follow education, i.e. was 
it individually profitable to follow education (positive private returns)? However, testing for this 
latter hypothesis shows that, after correction for foregone earnings, life expectancy, and probability 
of passing the exams, only the below shengyuan level students actually had positive returns. For an 
ordinary person it was therefore uneconomical to join in the civil examination system. Apparently 
this did not change, not even after the introduction of the modern education system, until the 1950s.  
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 This paper focuses on the pre-modern education system between 1744 and 1904. Although the modern 
schooling system was slowly introduced by Qing government from the 1860s onwards, it only really expanded 
after the abolishment of the civil service examination in 1905.   
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1. Introduction 
Human capital is considered an important, if not the main, driver of economic growth (Lucas 1988; 
Romer 1990; Mankiw, Romer, Weil 1992). Studies in economic development in Europe have shown it 
to have a positive effect on economic development already in the Early Modern period (e.g. Baten 
and Van Zanden 2008; Van Zanden and Van Leeuwen 2011) even though its development is generally 
considered to have been exogenous. Yet, in those countries, the educational system was becoming 
increasingly more productive with rapidly rising levels of years of education and literacy combined 
with economic development. Indeed, Mokyr (2009, 60) already showed that, whereas during the first 
Industrial Revolution the role of education in inventions was small, this changed over time.  
However, there is wide ranging discussion about similar trends in China. For example Rawski, 
(1979) and Li Bozhong (2003) argue that the pre-modern education system provided a source of economic 
progress. Directly opposite is the argument of Baten and Van Zanden (2007) who found in a Europe Asia 
comparison that, even though more human capital (i.e. book production in their analysis) led to higher 
per capita income, China was an anomaly with relatively high production of books and a relatively low per 
capita GDP (see also Allen et al. 2011). A similar observation is made by Van Zanden (2009) who found 
that, even though in Europe the skill premium (i.e. the difference between the skilled and unskilled wage) 
was smaller than in China, in Europe this led to more technological development and growth, while in 
China it did not. This is why Van Zanden (2009, 146) called China a continuous “enigma”. This changed, 
however, during the course of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 century when the position of the artisans was not 
hereditary anymore and the tax obligation did no longer go from father to son (Moll-Murata 2005, p. 14) 
causing the skill premium to increase. 
It becomes thus clear that people responded differently to education in Europe and China, at 
least after the first Industrial Revolution. In this paper we will aim to analyze how and why people 
responded to the possibility to follow education. However, little information on actual educational 
development in China is available. This makes it difficult to enter into any debate on the role of education. 
We might, in this respect, quote Ma (2004, 264) who, argues that “as is true of Chinese economic history 
in general, the scale and weight of the argument are an overfit for the amount of quantitative evidence 
presented.”  Indeed, except for age heaping measures presented in Baten et al (2010) and some stray 
observations from Rawski (1979), who put basic literacy level for Chinese male sin the late 19
th
 century at 
30-45% and for females at 2-10%, very little is known about education and literacy in Qing China. 
Therefore, in the next Section, we will present evidence on the stock of education in Chinese society 
between ca. 1744 and 1949. In Section 3, we move on to analyze  If (and how) this education system 
stimulated more people to educate their children as happened in Europe and which (in Europe) 
ultimately led to skill biased technological development. We end with a brief conclusion. 
 
2. Education development in the Qing dynasty 
At the start of the twentieth century, the education system in China changed fundamentally. It 
moved away from a traditional system, to a standard system, with primary, secondary, and higher 
education. The basic idea was to lift china in the world economy had already started at the end of the 
19
th
 century under the Qing government. However, most people remained educated for the civil 
examination exam until 1905 after which this was officially abolished (even though certain schools 
for traditional education were maintained until 1950). This abolishment led to resentment under the 
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literati who lost their guaranteed jobs in the government and joined the revolution by Sun 
Zhongshan in 1911 which ultimately led to the fall of the Qing government. 
 Although its revision turned out to be too slow and too late for the Qing government, the 
traditional education system during the Qing dynasty had become more complicated than it had ever 
been before. The Qing government not only continued many policies of its predecessor, the Ming, 
but also issued several new educational decrees itself. The first such decree entailed the rebuilding of 
the civil service examination. This examination system was the most important educational 
institution which allowed people to enter the gentry class. As such, successful students were given 
titles and positions by the government. Three levels of examination existed. Those passing the first 
level of examination were called “shengyuan”. Those who passed this exam might enter the 
provincial exams. Passing those would result in the title of “juren”. In turn, those passing the 
provincial exams could participate in the national exams to gain the title “jinshi”.  Shengyuan was 
considered "low class of gentry" and both the juren and jinshi were considered “upper class gentry”.  
             The second decree of Qing government regulated that students engaging in the civil service 
examination should follow education in official schools as had also been the case during the Ming 
dynasty. So it instituted a state-sponsored range of schools, which was integrated with the civil 
service examination. These official schools extended from the lowest administrative levels, the 
county government school( Xian Xue), to prefecture government school(Fu Xue). According to the 
Qing regulation, students ought to finish education in all levels of official schools before, after 
passing the first level examination, enrolling in the second level of examination (i.e. the provincial 
exams). In this way, the official schooling and the civil service examination became integrated.  
         The civil service examination, however, required a long time of study (see Table 1) and could 
therefore be called “elite education”.  But there was also education below the first level of civil 
service examination. This level of education has been ignored by scholars for a long time. Rawski’s 
(1979) book had the ambition to look into this education. Using her study, we can gauge the extent 
of so called popular education below the shengyuan. Based on a broad segment of historical 
evidences, we can witness that in general a boy started by learning to read and write at a large range 
of popular school at his age of 6 or 7.These popular schools included not only private schools built by 
clans and families but also community and charitable schools endorsed by local governments. These 
schools generally taught students basic reading, writing and calculating rather than preparing them 
for the shengyuan exams directly. During their period in this type of school, they could acquire the 
comprehension of 1,500 words, basic approaches of calculation and use of abacus which was enough 
to deal with most affairs in their daily life. Only a small part of the students continued after this 
popular education to pursue the shengyuan examination. For this purpose, the local government 
established a sort of higher academies titled Shuyuan, as well as other advanced community schools, 
to further educate talented students from popular schools.  With exception of the small part of 
talented students continuing their studies for the shengyuan examination, most students left popular 
schools to enter the local labor market in all kinds of different jobs varying from teaching in a primary 
school, to clerk to accountant in a shop or restaurant.     
Yet, by comparing with modern and standard education, the traditional education lacked 
such standard requests as the age of student’s enrollment, schooling time and age of student passing 
all levels of civil service examination. On the one hand, this was because reaching the level of jinshi 
 4 
 
was no small task. Some lucky people got the title of jinshi when they were very young while others 
spent the same amount of time and never even passed the shengyuan exams. Besides fortune, the 
final success of getting the level of jinshi depended to a great extent on the financial situation of the 
student’s family or clan. Some poor boys had to leave to get a job to support their family after 
following popular education for a short period. Some middle class or rich boys, however, could follow 
all levels of education being supported by the financing of their family or clan. In spite of the great 
difference of these private stories, we can still get the average estimates of the educational 
development in the Chinese population as we will discuss below  
According to a large sample of Qing students’ memoirs, children were encouraged to enroll in 
education at the ages of 6 or 7. They followed popular education during 5.5 years of study (varying by 
student from 3 to 8 years). A small part of talented students then carried on their preparation for 
shengyuan exam in the local higher academies for 10.5 or 11.5 years. After this exam, this student 
spent another 1.5 years in local schools followed by 5.5 years in private study or in higher academies 
like shuyuan to be able to enter the juren exam. After successful passing the juren exam, our student 
would spend another 4 years in private study. The estimates on the elite education come from the 
exam papers( 考试卷）from the Qing archives  by identifying  the average age of literati with passing 
different levels of exams. This study path is reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  Average age of admission to the 3 levels in the Qing dynasty and the average year 
of schooling education 
Levels of 
examination 
  average age of successful 
candidates 
Average years of formal 
schooling  
The first level               23 16 years under shengyuan 
The second 
Level 
              30 1.5 years under juren 
 The third Level               34  
 Sources:  average ages of admission to both levels of  juren and jinshi come from  Gu Tinlong：qingdai  
zhujuan jicheng，taibei  chengwen chubanshe ，1992.（顾廷龙主编：《清代朱卷集成》，台北成文出版社，
1992 年。）average years of formal schooling after the juren exam come from guangxu daqing huidian shili(光
绪《大清会典事例》）average age of admission to shengyuan  and average years of formal schooling for 
shengyuan exam come from Liu Zhaobin，qingdai keju，taibei dongda tushu youxian gongsi,1979.（刘兆瑸：
《清代科举》，台北东大图书有限公司，1979 年。） 
In sum, the traditional view was that there was only a sort of education system for the purpose 
of civil service examination which created a class of gentry and prepared for the future officials. Yet, 
according to our new exploration, Qing education had a complex system in which 5.5-year of popular 
education could be followed by either exit for the labour market, or 10.5 years for accessing the 
shengyuan exams (possibly followed by the juren and jinshi exams, also called “elite education”). 
Popular education thus serviced the elite- and vocational education (see Figure 1) 
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Figure 1: Education system in Qing China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
              Unfortunately, most of our data are from the civil exam candidates. All levels of exams included 
both civil and military exams. Whereas the civil exams intended to educated people for civil offices in the 
Metropolitan examination and palace examination 
Jinshi group  
Juren group  
Junior student examination  
Shengyuan group 
Provincial examination   
Small part of students carried on their study. They who 
prepared for examination were called as junior student, and 
stayed in the private school for the purpose of junior student 
examination for 10.5 years. It belonged to elite education. 
Children student who stayed in the private primary school 
for 5.5 years. It belonged to popular education 
eededucation. 
Most rest of students 
entered labor market and 
get their jobs    
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Qing government, the military exams were intended to educate future officials of the army. The numbers 
passing the exams (the so-called quota) were set by the central government. These quota were generally 
based on the population and numbers educated in a region and the amount of tax coming from that 
region.  This basically means that the quota moved in line with population (see Figure 2). 
 We mainly have access to these quota. For the shengyuan, we based ourselves on  qianlong 
xuezheng quanshu, jiaqing daqing huidian shili, daoguang daqing libu zeli, guangxu daqing huidian shili, 
guangxu daqing wuchang tiaoli and qingshilu( 乾隆《学政全书》、嘉庆《 大清会典事例》、道光《大清
礼部则例》、光绪《大清会典事例》、光绪《大清武场条例》与清代各朝实录），from which we 
collected the civil and military quota for the years 1744-1776, 1812, 1844, 1850, and 1875-1899. For the 
years 1900-1904 are assumed to be equal to 1899. For the juren, we based ourselves on the qianlong 
daqing huidian, xianfeng daqing kechang tiaoli, guangxu daqing huidian shili and guangxu daqing 
wuchang tiaoli （乾隆《大清会典》、咸丰《大清科场条例》、光绪《大清会典事例》与光绪《大清
武场条例》），again including the civil and the military quota. These were for the years 1744, 1812, 1852, 
1875-1899, the quota for 1900-1904 being assumed to be equal with those of 1899. Finally, based on 
qingdai jinshi timulu and qingshilu（《清代进士题名录》与清代各朝实录, we collected data on jinshi for 
all years between 1744 and 1904.  
 
Figure 2: Ratio of successful exam candidates to the total population 
 
Source: see text; Ho (1959); Cao (2001)  
  
 Now we should convert the number of gentry into the average years of education in the 
Chinese population. This can be done using a so-called Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM). 
Essentially, we just calculate the number of students per age class and sum them up over the years 
15-65, taking account for age specific mortality (for the method see for example Van Leeuwen and 
Foldvari 2012). However, calculating the number of students is not straightforward because there 
were no records including the total number of so called popular schools or the enrollment of 
students in these schools.  Hence, we used a proxy to calculate the number of students for popular 
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education (i.e. below the civil examination system) using the number of shengyuan.  In doing so, we 
need to make 2 assumptions. First, a possible assumption is that all students that entered popular 
education entered the Shengyuan examns. If that assumption were true, can arrive at number of 
students for the first level of exam by taking the number of shengyuan divided by the ratio of passing 
the first level of exam. This requires us to know the percentage students failing the exam. 
Fortunately, there were 15 regional cases which reported the local ratio of passing the first level 
exam make us to get the average ratio of passing the first level exam for the whole country in Qing 
China (i.e. 3% of all persons entering shengyuan exams passed [Daqing huidian lishi and 4 gazzetter in 
jiangsu province]).  However, this obviously is a minimum since, after their popular education, only 
small part of students could carry on their study for the shengyuan exam. Again making use of a set 
of 20 regional studies, we can estimate the average ratio between shengyuan and the total number 
of students (including those leaving popular education at an early stage). Finally, we can arrive at the 
total number of students by taking the successful shengyuan and correcting it for those failing the 
examns and dropping out earlier (i.e. 1 % of all persons starting popular education finally passed the 
shengyuan exams [10 Zhongguo shaoshu minzu shehui lishi diaocha ziliao congkan, 1996]).  
 Additional information we need are, obviously, the numbers of juren and jinshi. These were 
corrected for drop outs and failed examns in a similar way as the shengyuan before. However, since 
their numbers were much smaller, they did not affect our calculations of average years of education 
that strongly.  
Now we have for every year the number of students by level of education, and the average 
duration of their study. This will allow us to calculate a perpetual inventory method if we also have 
population by age class. Population by age class was calculated in the following way. First, we took 
the population estimates for the whole of China from Cao (2001) and interpolated it with the data 
from Ho (1959). However, it is difficult to calculate age classes due to lack of data. Hence, we took 
the age classes from the triennial census (Lee and Campbell 2010). Unfortunately, these data are all 
taken from Liaoning. Therefore, we took the ratio between the age classes of Liaoning (Mengxia and 
Qi 2009) and the whole of China (Van Leeuwen, Van Leeuwen-Li, and Foldvari 2011) around 1910 and 
used that to correct the age classes of the triennial census.  
Combing the age classes with the number of students, we can calculate for every year the 
number of students per age class. Summing this up for 50 years (between ages 15 and 65) and 
correcting for age specific mortality results in the total educational attainment in society per year. 
This can be divided by the total population to arrive at the average years of education in society. The 
results are reported in Figure 3 below. We also included estimates for age heaping from Baten et al 
(2010). In addition, we included a measure from age heaping from the triennial census.
2
 Both the 
heaping measures of Baten et al. and the triennial census were converted  
 
 
                                                           
2
 People did not heap on multiples of 5, but rather on three. It remains therefore highly questionable if age 
heaping is of much use in China, but at leads they show the same pattern as average years of education so that 
both apparently are driven by about the same underlying factors.  
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Figure 3: education and ABCC index 
 
Source: this text.  
 
in the ABCC index (a measure indicating the percentage of people in the population able to 
correctly state his/her age) for sake of easy comparison. We find that all series show about 
the same trend with a trough around the 1850s (the Taiping rebellion). This lends credence 
to our estimates about the change in educational attainments. 
 Indeed, we can find similar reassurance when reviewing the change from the 
traditional education system to the modern education system (see Figure 4). We find that,  
 
 Figure 4: switch from traditional to modern education system  
 
Source: This text; Van Leeuwen, Van leeuwen-Li and Foldvari (2011). 
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even though the switch already started in the late 19
th
 century, an increase in years of 
education only commenced in the late 1920s.   
 
3. Education from individual perspective 
In the previous Section we found that average years in the population remaind about constant over 
time. This suggests that there was at least no reinforcing trend with education and per capita income 
both increasing as may be found in Western Europe (see also Liu 2010). This apparently changed rom 
the 1920s when the demand for education among the population apparently rose without, however, 
showing signs of strongly improving per capita incomes.  
 The question is therefore why before the 1920s the demand for education among the 
population did not increase. In order to analyze this, we have to turn to private returns to education 
which may exist even in a static society, simply as an individual with more education usually have 
higher earnings, either reflecting their higher productivity or just their social status (for a recent  
Table 2: annual wages in silver liang by level of education 
 annual wage 
 1750 1850 1900 
jobs requiring jinshi or juren examinations    
official service in central government or local 
government 
3500 4000 5000 
secretarial assistants to high provincial 
officials 
1000 1200 1500 
lecturer in large shuyuan(college) 250 300 350 
    
jobs requiring shengyuan examination     
secretarial assistants to prefects and counties  100 150 250 
scholar doctor in local community  80 100 200 
service as gentry functions   80 100 120 
teacher in local school  70 80 100 
other services  70 80 100 
    
jobs with less than shengyuan education     
skilled labour in silk-reel industry 50 60 76 
teacher in local primary school  30 40 50 
    
jobs requiring no education    
general unskilled labour in big city 8 10 15 
general unskilled labour in small town or 
village  
6 7 8 
Source: Chung-li Chang (1962); Xuyi (2011); Zhang Dechang (1970).  
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example for the USA see for example Acemoglu and Angrist 2001). That is, investment in education 
may exist in a static, traditional society as well, at most, what we find is that the elite will not be able 
to expand relative to the size of the population and this is exactly what we found for China in Section 
2. 
It is generally suggested that the Chinese system of education and competitive examination 
system was a clear advantage over Europe and other cultures where education was inaccessible to 
the masses. In China, theoretically, anyone was eligible to follow education, and providing that 
he/she succeeded in the consecutive examination, at the highest level by the emperor himself, could 
achieve a very high and lucrative status. At least this is how the traditional story goes. 
In order to review this, we need to look at relative wages, which are reported in Table 2. 
What becomes immediately clear is that wage differences were large: jobs requiring the higher levels 
of education could earn as much as 500 times the wage of an unskilled laborer.  
 This finding seems to suggest that it is very beneficial for a person to follow education. 
However, in order to analyze this, we do not only need wage differentials, but also the time a person 
spends in school. In addition, we need to add the costs of following education. For this reason we re-
estimate the rate of returns to education with a correction not only for the duration of schooling, but 
also including the foregone wages (income that could have been earned if one had remained with  
 Table 3: rate of return by level of education corrected for foregone wages and life expectancy 
  
 1750 1850 1900 
jobs requiring jinshi or juren examinations    
official service in central government or local 
government 483% 432% 354% 
secretarial assistants to high provincial 
officials 126% 118% 95% 
lecturer in large shuyuan(college) 19% 17% 9% 
    
jobs requiring shengyuan examination     
secretarial assistants to prefects and counties  11% 15% 24% 
scholar doctor in local community  7% 7% 17% 
service as gentry functions   7% 7% 6% 
teacher in local school  5% 4% 4% 
other services  5% 4% 4% 
    
jobs with less than shengyuan education     
skilled labour in silk-reel industry 112% 110% 102% 
teacher in local primary school  60% 67% 61% 
 
the previous level of education), i.e. opportunity cost of education and also take account with the 
expected duration of the economically active period (duration of the cash-flow resulting from 
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education).
3
 Unsurprisingly, once we correct for the foregone wages and time spent in education  
(see Table 3), the rate of return to additional school years declined strongly, nevertheless it still 
seems profitable for the individual to follow education. There is one factor, though, that we still miss: 
namely the higher earnings were accessible for only those who passed the examination, and the 
success ratio was extremely low, around 1.5% for the shengyuan and 1.65% for the jinshi and juren 
examinations. These low probabilities significantly reduce the expected gains from education.
4
 Once 
we correct for this, the picture fundamentally changes (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4: rate of return by level of education corrected for foregone wages and life expectancy, and 
the probability of successful examination 
  
 1750 1850 1900 
jobs requiring jinshi or juren examinations    
official service in central government or local 
government -9% -10% -13% 
secretarial assistants to high provincial 
officials -14% -15% -15% 
lecturer in large shuyuan(college) -16% -16% -16% 
    
jobs requiring shengyuan examination     
secretarial assistants to prefects and counties  -9% -9% -9% 
scholar doctor in local community  -9% -9% -9% 
service as gentry functions   -9% -9% -9% 
teacher in local school  -9% -9% -9% 
other services  -9% -9% -9% 
    
jobs with less than shengyuan education     
skilled labour in silk-reel industry 110% 87% 60% 
teacher in local primary school  59% 45% 29% 
 
Now, that we corrected for opportunity costs, life expectancy, and the probability of 
successful exam, we have a better view about the profitability of studying in Qing China. However 
strange it may sound based on the high returns to education in Table 2, it is the expected rate of 
return that really matters for the decision making of the individual whether or not to follow 
education reported in Table 4. And Table 4 suggests that for a rational decision maker it was not 
profitable to take any exams. It was on the other hand a quite wise decision (from a purely profit 
perspective of course) to follow some education and leave the system before entering the shengyuan 
exam.  Our finding thus implies that only the wealthy can study: it would have been economically 
                                                           
3
 24 year with jinshi or juren examination, 35 years with shengyuan examination,40 years for the rest 
4
 In other words, we introduce expected lifetime earnings, whcih is the product of the succesful examination 
and the higher earnings. 
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more profitable to actually not follow education, or only below shengyuan. Education could thus be 
followed because of social status (since the ones doing the exams had money anyway). 
This finding thus argues strongly against the vision that the education system was efficient in 
generating social returns.  More interesting, it also suggests an explanation of the conundrum was 
the levels of education were relatively high (and the skill premium relatively low)) versus the 
GDP/cap in the 17
th
 century compared to the data of most other countries. Until the 17-18
th
 
centuries, the position of an artisan was regulated by the government, including his income. In the 
17
th
-19
th
 centuries, this position was slowly becoming regulated by the free market.  Since the 
relative low efficiency (also witnessed in relative high interest rates on capital), this was bound to 
lead to the high skill premia we found in this section and which match up better with the relatively 
low levels of GDP/cap.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The civil examination system in China has been a topic of wide debate over the past decades. Some 
have argued it was efficient and furthered growth (Rawski 1979; Li bozhong 2004; 2006), while 
others have stressed its inefficient nature, which led to the introduction of the modern education 
system in the closing decades of the 19
th
 century, followed by its total collapse in 1905.   
 Yet, neither stance has been supported by much empirical evidence. Therefore, in this paper 
we made a first (and preliminary) attempt to analyze the development of the education system in 
Qing China. We find, as is well known in static societies, that the civil examination quota moved in 
line with total population. More interesting, both our estimates of average years of education in 
society and the ABCC indices show that the level of education decreased in the mid-19
th
 century, 
before rising again, lending credence to our estimates of the stock of education.  
 Yet, we find indeed that society seems static till the mid 1920s, well after the modern 
education system had been introduced. Afterwards, a significant increase ein average years of 
education occurs without, however, accompanying per capita income growth. This begs the question 
why society remained static as regards to education up to the 1920s. In order to analyze this 
question, we have to look whether education was profitable on an individual level in Qing China. And 
indeed, the wide wage differences between education levels suggest that it was profitable to invest 
in education for the individual. Yet, after correction for foregone earnings, life expectancy, and 
probability of passing the exams, it turns out that only the below shengyuan level students actually 
had positive returns. For an ordinary person it was therefore uneconomical to join in this education 
system. Hence, the higher levels of the education system were only accessible for those who already 
possessed enough income.  
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